Deficits, public debt dynamics, and tax and spending multipliers

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- What are the effects of fiscal austerity?
- General point: the effects of any given instrument adjustment are **never unambiguously defined** unless we **define the policy regime** in which the adjustment occurs
- Paper calculates effects of short-run and long-run fiscal adjustments
 - Under various financing assumptions
 - Decomposes direct and indirect effects
- Paper compares how fiscal effects change when interest rates hit their lower bound
 - At zero bound, fiscal adjustments may have powerful effects on output
 - Warning: in severe crisis, cutting public spending or raising taxes may increase the deficit

• The standard New Keynesian pieces:

- IS curve; AS curve
- (Sticky prices, flexible wages, no physical capital)
- Government budget constraint:
 - Public spending, income taxes, consumption taxes, lump sum taxes
 - Nominal public debt

Monetary policy:

- Inflation peg
- Subject to zero lower bound

- Crisis scenario
 - Shock to discount factor alters natural real interest rate
 - Zero lower bound may bind
- Simplified infinite-horizon timing
 - "Short run": Persistent preference shock lowers natural interest rate
 - "Short run" ends with probability $1-\mu$ per period
 - "Long run": deterministic
- Study effects of fiscal adjustments
 - Compare adjustments of spending and taxes
 - Compare nonbinding/binding ZLB in short run
 - Distinguish direct short-run effects of fiscal adjustments ...
 - ... from the effects associated with financing those adjustments

First study effects of short-run changes in instruments, without any further distortions.

- (1). Change one fiscal instrument in the short run, balance budget by adjusting lump sum taxes
 - Change spending, income taxes, or consumption taxes
 - Calculate short-run effects on output, deficit...
 - ... conditional on nonbinding/binding zero lower bound

Indirect budgetary effects of policy changes

Next, study policy adjustments required for long-term budget balance.

- (2A.) Change one fiscal instrument in the long run, balance budget by adjusting lump sum taxes
 - Calculate long-run effects on output
 - Calculate short-run effects on output and deficit with/without ZLB
- (2B.) Faster debt growth in the short run, then bring debt back to steady state in long run by exponentially declining adjustment of one fiscal instrument
 - Fix long-run half-life of deviations from steady state
 - Calculate long-run convergence path
 - Calculate short-run effect on output with/without ZLB
- (2C.) Larger primary deficit in the short run, then bring debt back to steady state in long run by exponentially declining adjustment of one fiscal instrument
 - Fix long-run half-life of deviations from steady state
 - Calculate long-run convergence path
 - Calculate short-run effect on output with/without ZLB

Comments on the scenarios compared

- To simplify the algebra, changes in interest payments are assumed financed by lump sum taxes
- Considering this simplification, is it really necessary to distinguish these two?

$$(2B): \quad \hat{b}_t - \hat{b}_{t-1} = \epsilon \tag{1}$$

(2C):
$$\hat{b}_t - \hat{b}_{t-1} - \frac{\bar{i}\bar{Y}}{\bar{b}}\hat{b}_{t-1} = \epsilon$$
 (2)

- A more informative alternative might be:
 (2D.) Lower lump-sum taxes in the short run, then bring debt back to steady state in long run by exponentially declining adjustment of one fiscal instrument
 - Fix long-run half-life of deviations from steady state
 - Calculate long-run convergence path
 - Calculate short-run effect on output with/without ZLB

Now study a short-run change in government spending financed by long-run adjustments in spending or distorting taxes.

• Short-run output effect of changing government spending

- \approx Direct effect of spending now on output now
- + Effect of spending now on deficit now
- \times Effect on output now of paying off later one unit of deficit now (conditional on instruments chosen to pay down the debt)

$$\frac{\Delta Y_t}{\Delta G_t}\Big|_{\textit{TOTAL},\tau'} \approx \left. \frac{\Delta Y_t}{\Delta G_t} \right|_{(1)} + \left. \frac{\Delta D_t}{\Delta G_t} \right|_{(1)} \times \left. \frac{\Delta Y_t}{\Delta D_t} \right|_{(2C),\tau'}$$

Calculations for Great Depression (i = 0)

• Short-run output effect of raising government spending (conditional on lowering government spending later)

$$\frac{\Delta Y_t}{\Delta G_t}\Big|_{TOTAL,G} \approx \left. \frac{\Delta Y_t}{\Delta G_t} \right|_{(1)} + \left. \frac{\Delta D_t}{\Delta G_t} \right|_{(1)} \times \left. \frac{\Delta Y_t}{\Delta D_t} \right|_{(2C),G}$$
$$\approx 2.2 - 0.3 \times 1.8 = 1.7$$

• Short-run output effect of raising government spending (conditional on raising income taxes later)

$$\frac{\Delta Y_t}{\Delta G_t} \Big|_{TOTAL,\tau'} \approx \left. \frac{\Delta Y_t}{\Delta G_t} \right|_{(1)} + \left. \frac{\Delta D_t}{\Delta G_t} \right|_{(1)} \times \left. \frac{\Delta Y_t}{\Delta D_t} \right|_{(2C),\tau'} \\ \approx 2.2 - 0.3 \times (-1.9) = 2.8$$

• Short-run output effect of raising government spending (conditional on raising income taxes later)

$$\approx$$
 2.2 - 0.3 \times 2.2 = 1.5

- The formula might seem to have a chain rule in it, but it does not.
- Formula assumes the deficit that must be paid off is the one that would result **if the deficit were to be paid off using lump sum taxes**.
- Is there any reason to assume that the initial deficit occurring under lump-sum tax financing is approximately equal to the one occuring under distortionary financing?

Alternative decompositions

Consider:

B. History with $\Delta G_{SR} > 0$ financed by lump sums

A. Baseline history C. History with $\Delta G_{SR} > 0$ financed by $\Delta G_{LR} < 0$

D. History with lumps_{SR} < 0 financed by $\Delta G_{LR} < 0$

• Approximation says:

$$\Delta Y_{A \to C} \approx \Delta Y_{A \to B} + \Delta D_{A \to B} \times \frac{\Delta Y_{A \to D}}{\Delta D_{A \to D}}$$

• Why should that be a good approximation?

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Alternative decompositions

Consider:

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• Exact depreciation is simply

$$\Delta Y_{A \to C} = \Delta Y_{A \to B} + \Delta Y_{B \to C}$$

• Can't $\Delta Y_{B \rightarrow C}$ be calculated analytically in this model (working backwards from LR equilibrium)?

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The bigger picture

- Analytically tractable expressions for fiscal multipliers in standard textbook model are a valuable contribution
- Change at ZLB is strikingly large
- Important warning: in short run, **public spending reductions may** cause higher deficits!
- Nonetheless, let's remember that the effects of short-run adjustments are **not** the most important issue for Europeans to debate right now.
- For the Eurozone to function, member states must act to **ensure their long-run solvency**
 - What kinds of fiscal rules guarantee long-run solvency?
 - What structural reforms can get growth moving?
- "Austerity" is crucial, but the truly relevant constraint is the **intertemporal budget constraint**, not the short-run deficit *per se*.